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GLOBAL INSOLVENCY LAW AND THE 
ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Christoph G. Paulus∗ 
he topic of this symposium, Bankruptcy in the Global Village: The 
Second Decade, is grand and demanding. The concept of a “global 
village” implies something beyond the technicalities of particular na-
tional laws; instead, it conjures a view of bankruptcy that transcends na-
tional legal systems—bankruptcy at a meta-level. But this conference is 
not only geographically “meta.” It is also temporally “meta.” It seeks to 
transcend time as well as space. The reference to “the second decade” 
harks back to an earlier symposium at Brooklyn Law School organized 
by Professors Barry Zaretsky and Ian Fletcher that still forms an impor-
tant cornerstone for many insolvency-related discussions.1 The topic of 
this symposium thus includes past and present, national institutions and 
multinational lawmaking efforts. With these multiple dimensions in 
mind, I would like to trace a few themes as a prelude to the discussion of 
the next few days. 
I. THE FIRST DECADE 
Choosing 1996 as a starting point does some injustice to the decades 
that came before. The introduction of Chapter 11 into the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code in 1978 initiated a worldwide re-thinking of the options that 
bankruptcy law can offer.2 Similarly, the invention of “protocols” by 
creative judges and practitioners created a powerful tool to overcome the 
stalemate situations that arise frequently in cross-border bankruptcies as 
a result of conflicts among national bankruptcy laws.3 But choosing 1996 
                                                                                                  
 ∗ The author is a Professor of Law at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin of Civil 
Law, Civil Procedure Law, Insolvency Law, and Ancient Roman Law. He is a member of 
the International Insolvency Institute, the American College of Bankruptcy, the Interna-
tional Association of Procedural Law, and the International Academy of Commercial and 
Consumer Law. He has worked as a consultant both for the International Monetary Fund 
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 1. Symposium, Bankruptcy in the Global Village, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L LAW 1 (1997). 
 2. Outside the United States, the stigmatizing effect of a bankruptcy proceeding has 
been—and in many regions of this world still has—a powerful blocking impact on the 
efficiency of a reorganization option. The idea of a fresh start to be offered to a debtor 
through the bankruptcy proceeding has been for quite a long time unique to the United 
States. 
 3. The beginning of this invention is marked by the Maxwell case. See Evan D. 
Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, The Role of the Examiner as Facilitator and Harmon-
izer in the Maxwell Communication Corporation Insolvency, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 
IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 621 (Jacob S. 
T 
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also recognizes that the mid-nineties saw bankruptcy law elevated to a 
central position in the globalizing world. The East Asia crisis brought the 
world perilously close to a global economic breakdown when Japan, 
Russia, and finally Brazil, one after the other, followed the so called Ti-
ger States to the brink of economic collapse. This threat led the then-G7 
States (now G8) to form a new multilateral institution, the Financial Sta-
bility Forum, to develop tools to prevent a similar crisis in the future. 
The efforts made by this forum are reported on its Web site.4 One of its 
most prominent products is the articulation of twelve legal attributes that 
are crucial for a country’s financial stability, such as accounting and au-
diting standards, fiscal transparency, and banking and insurance supervi-
sion as well as insolvency and creditor rights. The inclusion of insol-
vency law on the list is a new development; insolvency law is newly seen 
and understood as a safeguard and anchor for the stability of a country’s 
financial health.  
The task of supervising and fostering legal developments in each one 
of the twelve areas is entrusted to various institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), or the World Bank. At the peak of 
the crisis in early 1998, the IMF was pushed to take care of this area and 
in 1999 it published its description of a fundamental pattern for orderly 
and effective insolvency procedures.5 Thereafter, however, responsibility 
shifted to the World Bank, which developed a more detailed set of prin-
ciples for insolvency law and creditors’ rights. The ultimate result, the 
Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights 
Systems, was made public in 2001.6 
The perception of insolvency law’s global importance extended be-
yond the Bretton Woods institutions. Initiated by an Australian proposal, 
the United Nations—more precisely, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)—sought to draft yet another 
guidebook for insolvency legislation. UNCITRAL developed guidelines, 
which were published in 2004 and may now be the most voluminous 
                                                                                                  
Ziegel ed., 1994); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2531 (1996). 
 4. See Financial Stability Forum, About the Compendium of Standards, 
www.fsforum.org/compendium/about.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). 
 5. These procedures are published in a booklet available on the IMF’s Web site. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures (1999), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/index.htm. 
 6. World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor 
Rights Systems (2001), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/ 
PrinciplesAndGuidelines/20162797/Principles%20and%20Guidelines%20for%20 
Effective%20Insolvency%20and%20Creditor%20Rights%20Systems.pdf. 
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book ever written on global insolvency legislation.7 The work of 
UNCITRAL and the World Bank were not identical, so the addressees—
that is, the legislative decision makers—were initially somewhat troubled 
when they had to decide which of the guidelines to follow. However, in 
2005, after having clarified the differences, the World Bank drafted a 
revised version of its Principles and blended them with UNCITRAL’s 
Legislative Guide.8 The consequence thereof is that the Financial Stabil-
ity Forum has entrusted both multilateral institutions with shared9 re-
sponsibility. 
Why, after years and years of disinterest has insolvency law suddenly 
become the focus of not one, but three multilaterals? As noted above, the 
East Asian bubble made it clear that a crucial factor for investors inter-
ested in a particular jurisdiction is an insolvency law that is effective, and 
guarantees an orderly proceeding with a fair, transparent, and predictable 
treatment of the stakeholders. However, this insight is not new. The roots 
go back to the early sixteenth century in Antwerp, the then economic 
metropole of Europe, when foreign merchants demanded from the Town 
Fathers the enactment of a bankruptcy law for their protection.10  
Here I can offer a few thoughts about the relevant factors. The answer 
itself seems, at first, irritatingly ephemeral. When one takes the psycho-
logical stance of a foreign investor, however, the lessons of Antwerp and 
Asia seem obvious: from that perspective it is perfectly understandable 
that equitable treatment of a debtor’s creditors is preferable to a system 
                                                                                                  
 7. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Legisla-
tive Guide on Insolvency Law (rev. 2005), available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/ 
english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf. For a description of its legal parameters, see 
Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking, 32 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851 (2007); for its contents, see Jacob Ziegel, Canada-United States 
Cross-Border Insolvency Relations and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 1041 (2007). 
 8. World Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (rev. 
2005), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ 
LAWANDJUSTICE/GILD/0,,contentMDK:20774193~pagePK:64065425~piPK:162156
~theSitePK:215006,00.html. 
 9. “The World Bank is co-ordinating a broad-based effort to develop a set of princi-
ples and guidelines on insolvency regimes. The United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which adopted the Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency in 1997, will help facilitate implementation.” Financial Stability Forum, 12 Key 
Standards for Sound Financial Systems, http://www.fsforum.org/compendium/key_ 
standards_for_sound_financial_system.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). 
 10. For this example, see also Christoph G. Paulus, A Short History of European In-
solvency Law, INSOL WORLD (SILVER JUBILEE ISSUE), 2007, at 14; Christoph G. Paulus, 
Entwicklungslinien des Insolvenzrechts, 61 KTS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INSOLVENZRECHT 239, 
242 (2000) (F.R.G.). 
758 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:3 
in which the creditors are afraid that the debtor is playing a game—alone 
or in a collusive way with some of the other creditors—the outcome of 
which is not equal (or at least transparent and predictable). In the absence 
of transparency and equality of distribution, distribution of the remnants 
of a business may be only the prelude to another game, played without 
these foreign creditors (or most of them). A disturbingly clear example 
for such a strategy seems to be the present-day Yukos case in Russia.11  
From a legal perspective, however, things are more complicated. First, 
it is axiomatic that insolvency law is a focus point for the commercial 
law of any jurisdiction. Just as a painter creates the impression of three-
dimensions by reference to a focus point, numerous legal areas such as 
the law of secured transactions, corporate law, corporate governance, 
non-performing loans trading, out-of-court-settlements—to name but a 
few—become fully understandable only against the background of a na-
tion’s insolvency law.12 Therefore, if insolvency law is a pillar of a juris-
diction’s commercial law, the need is manifest to build it up in a particu-
larly strong, efficient, and stable manner. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, insolvency law has the poten-
tial to influence not only an economy’s micro-level, but also its macro-
level. Insolvency law is now (and newly) politically salient. As such, it is 
burdened with political expectations or demands. As increasing numbers 
of enterprises break down, and huge companies like Enron, Parmalat, 
Asia Pulp & Paper, or Varig go bust, the efficiency of insolvency law is 
tested in a way that goes far beyond almost any other law. Public scru-
tiny as well as political guilt-shifting and grandstanding are then very 
likely on the agenda. Reform or introduction of a national insolvency law 
with the option of a reorganization proceeding is a convenient vehicle 
that allows the political class to comfortably reject any claims for a bail-
out of firms that are seen by the public as too big to fail. Responsibility 
for rescue is shifted to the administrator or the courts in charge. 
And finally, in this context, an orderly and effective insolvency law 
exerts a disciplining function on all actors on the stage. It is the art of 
good insolvency legislation to strike a balance between disciplining the 
debtor13 as well as the creditors. Experience teaches that this can be done 
                                                                                                  
 11. See generally Joseph Tanega & Dmitry Gololobov, Yukos Risk: The Double Edge 
Sword, A Case Note on International Bankruptcy Litigation and the Transnational Limits 
of Corporate Governance, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. (forthcoming 2007). 
 12. Elsewhere, I have tried to elaborate this idea in more detail. See Christoph G. 
Paulus, Verbindungslinien des Modernen Insolvenzrechts, 49 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 2189 (2000) (F.R.G.). 
 13. In times of systemic economic difficulties, legislators might wish to alter their 
insolvency laws to an overly protective system for the debtors. If they do so, they are well 
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in various ways: there is no self-evident primacy of a creditor-driven sys-
tem over a court-driven system,14 as there is no clear evidence that a 
harsh system is better or worse than a lenient one. What is necessary and 
decisive is the credible threat for the debtor not to escape into an insol-
vency proceeding for his own benefit and for the creditors not to push 
their common debtor into such proceedings for their benefit. No one 
should stand to gain something in an insolvency proceeding that could 
not be gained outside of it. 
All of these preceding considerations point towards insolvency law’s 
overarching importance and offer a justification for the multilaterals’ 
efforts in this field. However, irritating counterexamples exist that un-
dermine the validity of these very considerations. The most important of 
these examples is the present-day Chinese economy. While China’s new 
insolvency law came into force on July 1, 2007,15 it has a multi-year pe-
riod of enormous economic growth behind it without precedent in eco-
nomic history—and without an effective insolvency law! Be this as it 
may, history is full of countless examples of the driving force of mere 
perception without any proven factual justification.  
Now that there are three guidelines out in the world—the smallest and 
earliest from the IMF; the medium sized, second, from the World Bank; 
and the most voluminous and, for now, the last word, from 
UNCITRAL—there is a momentum that can be observed in insolvency 
law’s world which points towards a certain substantive global conver-
gence. This convergence may occur through the force of the IMF’s and 
the World Bank’s conditionality or the respective anticipated obedience, 
or it may occur through a national political leadership’s wish to connect 
its country with the modern stream of essential legislation, or it might 
occur simply through the persuasive power and quality of these guide-
books. Regardless of the reason, there is a broad movement all over the 
                                                                                                  
advised to re-change it after the end of such crisis. The Statute of Colombia from 1996 is 
a striking example for this attitude and the disadvantages of “sticking to it until now.” See 
generally Adolfo Rouillon, World Bank, Colombia: Derechos de Crédito y Procesos 
Concursales (May 2006). Note, however, that Colombia is about to change its law (from 
mid-2007 on) to make it a bit more balanced. 
 14. An example is comparison between the two neighboring countries of France and 
Germany: the former has quite a court-driven system, whereas the latter is prominently 
creditor-driven. For the latter approach, see Manfred Balz, Market Conformity of Insol-
vency Proceedings: Policy Issues of the German Insolvency Law, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
167 (1997). 
 15. For descriptions of the new law, see Bruno Arboit & Darren FitzGerald, A Great 
Leap Forward—China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, INSOL WORLD, Fourth Quar-
ter 2006, at 36; Mike Falke, China’s New Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy, 16 INT’L 
INSOLVENCY REV. 63 (2007). 
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world to comply with these standards.16 Even though the expert might 
recognize considerable differences in each volume, they have much in 
common. In particular, they all introduce a rescue proceeding which 
was—due to the worldwide predominant perception of a bankruptcy 
stigma on a bankrupt debtor—unthinkable in many jurisdictions only a 
decade ago. Nowadays, it is hard to find any insolvency law without this 
option.17 
However, one must take care not to be overoptimistic. The conver-
gence described, more often than not, refers to the law on the books 
rather than the law in action. Many countries have adopted quite modern 
insolvency legislation that appears on paper as successful approximations 
of the propositions in the guidebooks.18 But, upon closer inspection, it 
becomes apparent that the law in action bears little resemblance to the 
written law. For various reasons—ranging from opposition to intrusion 
by the imposing multilateral institution and its dominant shareholder(s) 
to sheer opportunism—institutions within jurisdictions defy this conver-
gent pull and simply ignore their codified law. 
This must be taken very seriously, not least because this attitude coin-
cides—accidentally or not—with a general problem of anti-globalization: 
the national actors might have the impression that they are forced to ac-
cept an imposed law that is designed to bring them in line with a certain 
capitalistic idea of bankruptcy law.19 Any answer to such an allegation 
                                                                                                  
 16. Elsewhere, I have described this development in somewhat more detail. See 
Christoph G. Paulus, Rechtsvergleichung im Nationalen und Internationalen Insol-
venzrecht: Eine Erfolgsgeschichte, in EINHEIT UND VIELFALT DES RECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT 
FÜR REINHOLD GEIMER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 795 (Rolf A. Schütze ed., 2002) (F.R.G.). 
 17. For an insightful report about the factual problems of implementing the respective 
rules in the Asia Pacific region, see Nick Hood, INSOL Europe, Management Change—
The Last Restructuring Taboo, in INTERNATIONAL CASELAW-ALERT No. 11, IV/2006, at 
4, (Aug. 27, 2006), available at http://www.eir-database.com/download/caselaw/7/ 
International-Caselaw---Alert-No-11-IV-2006-August-27,-2006.pdf. 
 18. Professor Halliday describes this divergence in his contribution to this symposium 
as “implementation gap.” Terence Halliday, Legitimacy, Technology, and Leverage: The 
Building Blocks of Insolvency Architecture in the Decade Past and the Decade Ahead, 32 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1081, 1098-99 (2007). 
 19. See the particularly telling story told by Boris Kozolchyk, Secured Lending and 
Its Poverty Reduction Effect, 42 TEXAS INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 12), 
available at http://www.law.arizona.edu/faculty/FacultyPubs/Documents/Kozolchyk/ 
ALS06-33.pdf. A Mexican NAFTA negotiator asked him:  
why it was that Mexico’s law of secured transactions had to resemble that of 
the United States and Canada, my reply was that the proper question was not 
what law Mexico had to emulate but whether Mexico did in fact desire secured 
lending. If it did, its law had to be based on principles that reflected those prac-
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by advocates of convergence must be based on a thorough analysis; an 
analysis that identifies deeper necessities such as the general need for 
economic development and/or empowerment of the poor20 or the like. If 
this is not done or—even worse—not possible, then the multilaterals 
would be well advised to refrain from further promotion of their guide-
books.21 Indeed, as a question mark, caution flag, or—depending on 
one’s own perspective—exclamation mark, to the best of my knowledge 
there has been little interest in how Arabic and the majority of African22 
countries deal with the break-down of their economic enterprises.23 And, 
almost never—irrespective of the ceteris paribus impressive internation-
ality of the respective drafting groups— are there any Arabic or African 
representatives participating. 
II. TRANSITION FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND DECADE 
These remarks bring us to the threshold of the second decade. The pull 
towards convergence of the world’s insolvency laws will predictably in-
crease, as the multilaterals appear to have developed an “appetite” for 
more. UNCITRAL is a striking example with its recently acclaimed 
search for further fields of engagement in the insolvency area. Now the 
work will go further into details; be it the treatment of groups in insol-
vency, court-to-court communication,24 arbitration in insolvency law, or 
something else. While more or less hailed and welcomed by the experts, 
                                                                                                  
tices tried and tested in active financial marketplaces and thus capable of uni-
versal usage. 
Id. 
 20. The fact that the enactment of a bankruptcy law has the potential to lead to an 
empowerment of the poor can be demonstrated in the context of the introduction of an 
insolvency law for states. See Christoph G. Paulus, A Statutory Proceeding for Restruc-
turing Debts of Sovereign States, 49 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 401, 
402–05 (2003) [hereinafter Paulus, Statutory Proceeding]. 
 21. For this, see also Halliday, supra note 18, at 1082-90. 
 22. An exception might be bigger states such as South Africa or regional attempts 
such as the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique 
(OHADA). 
 23. To be sure, most of these countries do have insolvency laws (many of them fol-
lowing quite closely the French model). However, what is questioned here is the law in 
action. 
 24. For this see, for instance, Jay Westbrook, The Duty to Seek Cooperation in Multi-
national Insolvency Cases, in THE CHALLENGES OF INSOLVENCY LAW REFORM IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 361 (Henry Peter, Nicolas Jeandin & Jason J. Kilborn eds., 2006); Chris-
toph Paulus, World Bank, Judicial Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvencies: An Out-
line of Some Relevant Issues and Literature (2006), http://siteresources.worldbank. 
org/GILD/Resources/GJF2006JudicialCooperationinInsolvency_PaulusEN.pdf. 
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it should not be forgotten that further convergence requires development 
of a common and basic understanding of the reason and need for this ex-
pansion, and the rationale must reach beyond the mere benefit of multi-
national companies. 
It seems to me that much is to be done in this respect; this has to be 
stressed particularly in light of the recommendations of one of the mem-
bers of the World Bank Group. Every year, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) publishes its Doing Business report, in which they 
measure the world’s economy using a purely creditor-oriented approach. 
In 2006, with respect to necessary insolvency reforms, they recom-
mended that the best solution is to give the creditors as much say in the 
proceeding as possible25—a remarkably simplistic statement which, of 
course, is heavily influenced by its own interest and the almost complete 
exclusion of any lawyer in the drafting process. One wonders how coun-
tries that traditionally have a strong emphasis on court-driven proceed-
ings and which are doing fine economically will react—the present 
China or India are ideal examples.  
The problem with the above-mentioned task of developing a sound and 
broad based justification for harmonization or convergence is that the 
need is arising at a time when the pace of change is increasing as well.26 
One indicator is that the worldwide expanding trade in non-performing 
loans has already led, in numerous cases, to a changed pattern of creditor 
behavior. The traditional model of bankruptcy law is based on the as-
sumption of a debtor bound together with all his creditors on the other 
side by bipolar face-to-face relationships27—a paradigm which implies a 
general mutual knowledge of debtor and creditor. It has now become the 
increasingly predominant economic reality that the debtor does not know 
who his creditors are; irritatingly enough, nor do the creditors know who 
their debtor is. The trading of claims on what is commonly called the 
“secondary market” continues even after an insolvency proceeding has 
commenced. As a German banker once told me: banks are trading with 
everything that has not climbed the tree by “three.” 
It might thus happen that an administrator has engaged in negotiations 
with creditors about a particular solution of the case—maybe even in 
                                                                                                  
 25. See World Bank, Doing Business 2007—How to reform, at 55 (2006). 
 26. See Simon Davis, Greater Use Should Be Made of Derivatives in Restructuring 
Transactions, in GLOBAL INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING YEARBOOK 2006/07 21 (4th 
ed..); Sijmen de Ranitz, Foreward: Global Trends in the Field of Restructuring and In-
solvency, in GLOBAL INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING YEARBOOK 2006/07 1 (4th ed..); See 
also INSOL INT’L, CREDIT DERIVATIVES IN RESTRUCTURINGS: A GUIDEBOOK (2006). 
 27. Note that the English word “obligation” stems from the Latin word “obligare,” 
which means primarily “to bind together.” 
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advance of opening the proceeding—and is thereafter confronted with a 
different set of creditors when the case is filed or once time has come to 
vote on the plan. To be sure, such a scenario need not automatically be 
unfavorable for the insolvency proceeding as such. There is, for instance, 
the possibility that an envisaged reorganization attempt will be enhanced 
by the introduction of new creditors. Assume that they have bought the 
respective claims from the original creditors for thirty cents on the dollar; 
this price makes it an economically sound judgment to accept a dividend 
of fifty cents in a case where the original creditors possibly would, after 
waiting out the case, have wanted more.28 On the other hand, there is an 
equally large chance that these new creditors may be willing to settle for 
a quick sale of the debtor’s business or assets, without any longer term 
strategy on the administrator’s or debtor’s side. 
As a rule of thumb, the anonymity which is the inevitable companion 
of this modern development in credit markets bears the threat of inhu-
manity. This interrelation is evidenced by long-lasting historical experi-
ence. Therefore, the new pattern of stakeholders might undermine a leg-
islature’s consideration of social policy; for example, French insolvency 
law with its strong emphasis on the protection of workers may find this 
policy swept away by the short-term interests of debt traders. In any case, 
work-outs are likely to become more complicated as there are more di-
verse interests involved. Cautious lenders are already beginning to exert 
some control over the possibility of restructurings by inserting “unani-
mous decisions clauses” into their loan agreements. Such clauses have 
achieved some prominence in the context of sovereign debt restructuring 
attempts.29 
A further consequence of converging insolvency procedures is that by 
enhancing the power of the court at the debtor’s center of main interest, 
forum shopping is likely to become even more prominent than it already 
is today.30 The European Insolvency Regulation presents the paradox 
clearly. Designed with the intent to prevent forum shopping by bringing 
the disparate insolvency legislations of the various member states closer 
together, this very regulation seems to have provoked forum shopping, 
                                                                                                  
 28. Example taken from Steven T. Kargman, Addressing Financial Distress in the 
Emerging Markets: An Overview of Key Concepts in Corporate and Sovereign Debt Re-
structurings, 31 CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (Organización de los Estados 
Americanos, Comité Jurídico Interamericano) 453 (2004). 
 29. See Paulus, Statutory Proceeding, supra note 20, at 401. 
 30. For this observation, see John A. E. Pottow, The Myth (and Realities) of Forum 
Shopping in Transnational Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 785 (2007); Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Where are all the Transnational Bankruptcies? The Puzzling Case for Uni-
versalism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 983 (2007). 
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and considerable litigation over forum choice! The obvious lesson to be 
learned therefrom is that partial harmonization, engagement and familiar-
ity may foster a search for potential advantages.31 This is not here the 
place to evaluate forum shopping as a general phenomenon and to dis-
cuss its pros and cons. All that is to be derived from this development is 
that insolvency practitioners must adjust to the new pattern and its de-
mands. They are increasingly confronted with situations in which they 
must evaluate conduct on the basis of foreign (or even multiple foreign) 
law(s). This hints at the thorny and inevitable question of whether or not 
a certain act or transaction done in one jurisdiction might trigger the 
avoidance laws of another? Needless to say that these new demands re-
quire highly qualified professionals. 
Finally—still speaking from brink of the second decade—the increased 
complexity of insolvency law and its strong emphasis on the reorganiza-
tion option gives reason to a new positioning of insolvency law in gen-
eral. To varying degrees, in many jurisdictions, insolvency law was seen 
as a somewhat isolated field with few direct connections to other areas of 
law.32 It followed its own set of rules, conditioned by the particular cir-
cumstances of the debtor’s insolvency. This remains unchanged, of 
course. What is likely to change, however, is the increasing awareness of 
an insolvency law’s function as part of a broader context.  
This context is best described (even in German) by “turnaround law.” 
Its unifying property is that it deals with those economic assets (includ-
ing workers, goods, services, and any other economically useful and 
valuable good) which, for whatsoever reason, are no longer (or, maybe 
even not at all) used in the most efficient manner and which shall be re-
positioned there. Seen from this perspective, insolvency law forms part 
of a large spectrum of seemingly disparate areas of law, such as corpo-
rate governance, the specific creditor protection rules within corporation 
law, distressed debt trading, out-of-court settlement law, and many oth-
ers. Insolvency law is, thus, no longer isolated but just a link—a very 
important one, of course—in a longer chain of other laws. The conse-
quence of this insight is that harmonization of insolvency law may not be 
                                                                                                  
 31. The statutory cornerstone for this search is—at least presently—the interpretation 
of the term “center of main interests”; for this, see Gabriel Moss, Group Insolvency—
Choice of Forum and Law: The European Experience Under the Influence of English 
Pragmatism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1005 (2007); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Locating the 
Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1019 (2007). 
 32. To be sure, this observation relates to this law’s perception and does, therefore, 
not contradict with what has been stated above about the objective influence of insol-
vency law on other fields of law. 
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enough. It will be necessary to integrate and adapt of insolvency law to 
this new legal surrounding.33 This is the task of the second decade. 
III. THE SECOND DECADE 
Having described the developments of the last decade, a few words 
about the likely further development of insolvency law are in order, as 
well as a warning about certain dangers which call for close monitoring 
by the experts. 
As indicated, the next years will likely be dominated by the effort to 
integrate the new insolvency environment into a coherent whole. This 
task will require hard work, beginning with the academics and then the 
practitioners and the multilateral institutions. In a world which is ever-
more interdependent, and which is equipped with limited resources, the 
need will increase to move these resources to their best possible (or high-
est-valued) use as smoothly and promptly as possible. 
The true difficulty with fulfilling this task will be, however, that it has 
to be done on a multi-dimensional cultural level. A “one-size-fits-all” 
approach is bound to fail. Not only do different jurisdictions have differ-
ent priorities, they may have entirely different understandings as to the 
goals of a proceeding—be it protection of the enterprise, protection of 
workers, or maximizing value for creditors. Notwithstanding the naïve 
solution proposed by the IFC in its Doing Business report, present politi-
cal realities will not permit a pure creditor-driven proceeding to be pre-
sented as the best possible (and certainly not a consensus) solution.34 
A further prediction must be mentioned, if only as an aside: as the 
world shrinks toward a global village, the question of how to deal with 
overindebted states—and thus their insolvencies—must move to the top 
of the agenda. To the extent that this picture of the world as a village be-
comes reality, there is no way not to deal with the economic disparities 
among nations. Like in any small village, the pressure on the rich to do 
something about the poverty of the neighbors will grow. It is my strong 
conviction that the right solution will not be found in the refinement of 
Collective Action Clauses but in the further development of what the 
IMF called a Sovereign Dispute Resolution Mechanism (SDRM).35 
Therefore, insolvency law will have to play its role in this context. 
                                                                                                  
 33. For example, as a consequence of the automatic stay reorganization within an 
insolvency proceeding, which might contradict the rules of the unfair competition law. 
 34. See Ian Fletcher, Maintaining the Momentum: The Continuing Quest for Global-
Standards and Principles to Govern Cross-Border Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 767, 
776-84 (2007). 
 35. See Paulus, Statutory Proceeding, supra note 20, at 401–02. 
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Another likely development in the second decade that calls for alert-
ness, particularly of the experts, and maybe even particularly of the aca-
demic experts, is greed. To the degree that economic globalization tran-
scends the borders of national legislatures, the greed of the “big players” 
in this game will likely seek to use harmonization efforts to shift aside 
local obstacles. Powerful entities seek, with greater or lesser success, 
exemptions from the applicability of certain local legal rules (tax law, 
labor law, environmental law, etc.). As lawmaking proceeds at the global 
level, such efforts may achieve even better results because of the scarcity 
of respective rules there, and the possibility of “one stop shopping.” 
A regional example is the decision of the Australian legislator in the 
late nineties to make netting-agreements insolvency-proof in their insol-
vency law in order to make the country more attractive for economic in-
vestment.36 An even more striking example is the Cape Town protocol as 
drafted by UNIDROIT:37 it provides for a worldwide applicable super-
priority for certain collateral in all insolvency laws on the globe. Even 
though so far restricted to only a few goods, a tendency behind any such 
attempt is recognizable; global rules shall be set in force which over-
throw the application of local laws for the benefit of global players with 
effective lobbyists (to be sure, not only in the realm of insolvency law38). 
The primary addressees of these attempts are, of course, the multilateral 
institutions such as UNIDROIT or IFC. Needless to say, the success of 
these attempts will undermine the fundaments of insolvency law, and in 
particular any broad-based economic justification for harmonization. 
                                                                                                  
 36. See Peter Costello, MP, Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia, Second 
Reading Speech on the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Bill, 1998, available 
at http://fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/PublicInfo/Speeches/FSI_SecondReading 
Speeches.rtf.  
 37. Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 108-10, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/ 
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UNIDROIT’s drafting of a further Protocol. Steven L. Harris, Choosing the Law Govern-
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 38. Another example would be article 54 of the Convention on the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) which provides 
for a enforcement title that has to be recognized by all states. For this, see Giuliana Canè, 
Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Revolutionary or Ineffective?, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
439 (2006); for a general description of the procedure, see Giorgio Sacerdoti, Investment 
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of Awards, 19 ICSID REV. 1 (2004). 
